Category: Articles & Op-eds

Blog: An affordable way to qualify for a home loan without that big down payment

Posted on by Rhina Portillo

For many Americans, the biggest hurdle in buying a home is the 20 percent down payment they think is required for mortgage approval. According to a recent survey by the National Association of Realtors, 34 percent of respondents believe they need more than 20 percent.

Meanwhile, low down payment mortgages account for a significant amount of home buying annually.

Families with down payments as low as 3 or 5 percent have been able to purchase a home thanks to private mortgage insurance (MI) for 60 years. Since 1957, MI has helped 25 million families become homeowners. In the past year alone, MI helped more than 795,000 homeowners purchase or refinance a mortgage. Nearly half were first time homebuyers and more than 40 percent had incomes below $75,000.

How MI works

Mortgage insurance is simple. In addition to the other parts of mortgage underwriting process — such as verifying employment and determining the borrower’s ability to afford the monthly payment — lenders traditionally required 20 percent down to ensure the borrower had some of their own money committed before the bank would provide a loan. This is where MI enters, bridging the down payment divide to qualify borrowers for mortgage financing.

Benefits of MI

  • It helps you buy a home, sooner. For the average firefighter or school teacher, it could take 20 years to save the typical down payment. Private mortgage insurers help borrowers qualify with as little as 3 percent down.
  • It’s temporary, leading to lower monthly payments. MI can be cancelled once you build 20 percent equity, either through payments or home price appreciation — typically in the first five to seven years. This is not the case for FHA loans, the federal government’s form of MI. The majority of which require MI for the life of the loan.
  • It provides several flexible payment options. Your lender can offer several options for MI payment; the most common is paid monthly along with your mortgage.
  • It’s tax-deductible. Subject to income limits, MI premiums are tax deductible — similar to interest paid on a mortgage. In 2014, 4 million taxpayers benefited from this deduction with the average being $1,402.

MI is a stable, cost effective way to obtain low down payment mortgages, and offers distinct benefits to borrowers. It’s been a cornerstone of the U.S. housing market for decades, providing millions the opportunity to own homes despite financial barriers. Ask your lender for low down payment options using MI.

Blog: Time to Be Transparent about Fannie and Freddie Upfront Risk Fees

Posted on by Lindsey Johnson

Data show homeownership has become out of reach for many and that reducing or eliminating upfront fees is overdue.

By Lindsey Johnson

Eight years after the global financial crisis, the U.S. housing market still lags the recovery of the overall economy—and the homeownership rate is at a 50-year low.[1] While the new administration will have many housing related issues to address in the first few years, access to credit should not be overlooked. I was reminded of this and inspired to write this blog after reading a front page story in The Wall Street Journal on December 4 titled “Credit Restrictions Cost Home Buyers ‘Deal of a Lifetime.’”[2]

Following the financial crisis, policymakers aimed to eliminate the riskiest mortgage products on the market and shore up the financials of those institutions that make up the housing industry. And, while we cannot turn our eyes away from safety and sound mortgage lending nor can we ever allow any of the riskier types of mortgages to return that led to the financial crisis, the pendulum has swung too far in some areas. To truly address concerns about consumers’ access to mortgage finance, a number of areas of government policy need to be discussed including: 1) the GSEs’ guaranty fees (“g-fees”) policy that was adopted after the financial crisis; 2) GSE Loan Level Pricing Adjustment (LLPA) fees that were added to g-fees during the crisis; 3) private mortgage insurers’ new Private Mortgage Insurer Eligibility Requirements (PMIERs) that were established by the GSEs; and 4) the Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) pricing and underwriting practices. We will explore many of these topics in future writings, but will focus on one specific aspect here—LLPAs.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac charge g-fees, which are the fees borrowers pay to have their mortgage backed by the Federal government through the GSEs. In 2008, the GSEs added LLPAs to further shield the GSEs against the risk of defaults. These crisis-era fees were levied on homebuyers in addition to other fees and costs for managing their risk, based largely on two factors—credit score and the size of their down payment—and most borrowers do not even know about these additional fees. The current president of the National Association of Realtors (NAR) put it best in an American Banker column when he stated “homebuyers are paying a steep price at the closing table in the form of unnecessary fees that, for some, put homeownership out of reach.”[3] Without being transparent about these so-called upfront risk fees, LLPAs will continue to exacerbate a serious concern over the efforts to re-balance these fees in a post-crisis environment.

Low-down payment programs are designed for families who need the help, but the impact of LLPAs on the cost of Fannie or Freddie-backed low-down payment mortgages has been chilling. The Wall Street Journal reports that, “Fannie and Freddie increased fees for riskier borrowers, widening the gap between mortgage rates available to borrowers with good and weak credit.”

This is indeed true. The Treasury Department noted in a recent report, the “credit score of the typical new mortgage borrower is nearly 40 points higher than the typical borrower in the early 2000s.” The “average credit score for those obtaining a loan backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac…in conservatorship is nearly 750”—near perfect credit. And the “loan-to-value” is 80%, which means average down payments are roughly 20% of the home purchase price. These facts are “especially sobering given the fact that more than 40% of all FICO scores nationally fall below 700.”[4] I would argue that these trends mean there are many creditworthy families of all socioeconomic backgrounds deserving of conventional mortgages who are simply unable to buy their first home!

Costs of LLPA Fees on Homebuyers and Taxpayers

LLPAs impose significant costs on homebuyers and disproportionately harm first-time homebuyers and those without large down payments. If a homebuyer puts down 5% on a $200,000 home, and the borrower has a 660 FICO score and is applying for a $190,000 mortgage, then the upfront LLPA is 2.25% on this loan. The borrower will pay for this by either bringing $4,275 additional funds to closing (190,000* 2.25%) or accepting a 0.50%-0.55% higher interest rate. That higher interest rate translates to an additional $50 per month on your mortgage payment. Over 5 years that is more than $3,000 in additional interest and over the life of the loan the borrower pays more than $18,000 in additional interest.

USMI was one of 25 organizations that wrote to FHFA Director Mel Watt in June about the need to eliminate or reduce these arbitrary crisis-era fees. Fortunately, since the financial crisis, defaults have gone down for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the fact that new underwriting rules have dramatically improved the quality of the GSE portfolio of new home loans, meaning there is a whole lot less risk on the GSEs’ books as these mortgages are performing well. Yet while the cumulative default rate has decreased from 13.7% to almost zero, GSE g-fees, which include LLPAs, have nearly tripled since the mortgage crisis. Therefore, these arbitrary fees are being imposed on borrowers, even though lending is safer and the fact that private mortgage insurance already mitigates the risk the borrower may not repay their loan. Essentially, LLPAs are double charging the borrower for the same risk. The data simply does not justify these fees anymore.

FHFA Responds…

Director Watt’s August 1 response to the 25 groups who called for FHFA and the GSEs to reduce or eliminate these LLPA fees was that “although positive developments in the mortgage market continue to occur, we believe the current g-fees and LLPAs continue to strike the risk balance.”[5] However, speaking at the MBA’s Annual Convention & Expo in October, Director Watt acknowledged that the post-2008 recovery in the housing market has been “disappointingly uneven” in many areas of the country. Not only has the recovery been slower for urban and low-income communities, but these same communities continue to have the hardest time achieving homeownership today.

NAR said in the American Banker column that the GSEs are “charging homeowners for far more risk than they [the GSEs] took on, driving tremendous profit.” The GSEs have paid more than $200 billion to the U.S. Treasury in recent years; given the GSEs are under conservatorship and are mandated to go to zero capital by 2018, the GSEs should continue to focus on providing access to credit for a broad range of borrowers.

The GSEs have a mission to “promote homeownership, especially access to affordable housing.”[6] It is time to eliminate or reduce these unnecessary fees and bring down costs for homebuyers, considering most low-down payment mortgages already come with private mortgage insurance protection—risk that Fannie and Freddie do not have to bear. Private MI has covered first loss mortgage credit risk ahead of American taxpayers for 60 years and mortgage insurers are ready to do more.

[1] Census Bureau

[2] http://www.wsj.com/articles/credit-restrictions-cost-home-buyers-deal-of-a-lifetime-1480874593

[3] http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/fees-meant-to-shield-gses-from-risk-are-hurting-homebuyers-1091054-1.html

[4] Antonio Weiss and Karen Dynan, Housing Finance Reform: Access and Affordability in Focus https://medium.com/@USTreasury/housing-finance-reform-access-and-affordability-in-focus-d559541a4cdc#.gu5ifppus

[5] Mel Watt, FHFA Letter to Stakeholders on LLPAs

[6] Chairman Ben Bernanke, ICBA Conference Speech: GSE Portfolios, Systemic Risk, and Affordable Housing https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070306a.htm

Blog: 2017: An Opportunity to Coordinate America’s Housing Policy

Posted on by Lindsey Johnson

By Lindsey Johnson

While the housing finance system in the United States has developed into an ad hoc set of entities and programs, so has the regulatory system around it with more than seven[i] federal agencies playing a role in the formation of policy and regulation of activities for housing finance. Despite the expansive reach of the federal government in the housing finance system and the exhaustive list of government agencies regulating it, safety and soundness gaps exist, access to credit remains tight, and potential homeowners continue to fall through the cracks. Housing policy has become political in addition to being complex and has therefore created an environment where meaningful reforms are rarely achieved. However, the outcome of the historic 2016 election means that one party will control all three branches of government starting in 2017, which presents a unique opportunity to examine the underpinnings of the housing finance system and establish a more comprehensive and coordinated approach to housing policy, rather than just tinkering around the edges of the mortgage finance industry.

Here are three overarching housing considerations and recommendations for the new Congress and Administration:

  1. There is a need for more coordinated, comprehensive, and transparent federal housing policy.
  2. All attempts to reform the housing finance system should fix the parts of the system that were and are broken, while enhancing the parts of the system that work. Part of the solution to fix what is broken is to identify and address areas of inconsistency and redundancy.
  3. Private capital should play a much greater role in the housing finance system. There should be a regulatory body that sets safety and reliability rules for market players on an equitable basis. Further private capital, not government and taxpayers support, should be encouraged to provide access to credit and protect against credit risk where possible in the housing finance system.

Since major housing policy tends to be reactionary and seldom comprehensive, inconsistencies and overlaps have developed resulting in dramatic shifts between the completely private market (PLS market), the semi-government backed market (conventional market via Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), and the fully government-backed Ginnie Mae market (FHA, VA, and USDA). One such area of inconsistency is in low downpayment lending, which is increasing as a proportion of the overall residential mortgage market. Currently, a single borrower is subject to different requirements and pays different premium rates for insurance or a guarantee on a low downpayment loan under private mortgage insurance (MI), the FHA, the USDA’s Rural Housing Service, the Department of Veterans Affairs, or state Housing Finance Agency programs—even though the borrower’s risk profile remains the same.

A coordinated policy would inform how low downpayment lending in the U.S. is carried out. For example, it is common in other types of insurance such as crop, flood and terrorism insurance, to limit government programs to higher risk borrowers or to condition access to supplemental capacity by requiring some demonstration of the need for that capacity. The FHA’s current loan limits do not provide a level playing field nor is there a direct preference for a private capital alternative.  Instead, any preference is done indirectly through premium rate setting and competition, which results in an unstable policy environment. The resulting outcome is dramatic fluctuations between these mortgage finance markets, which at times is most evident between the private mortgage insurance market and the 100% government-backed mortgage insurance market at FHA. While it may seem normal to have some fluctuations during different housing cycles, the recent market fluctuations have most often been the result of competition for market share between the two. This is neither conducive for the most efficient and effective mortgage finance market nor does it ensure that borrowers are being best served. Furthermore, there are redundancies and significant overlap between several government agencies such as FHA and the Rural Housing Service (RHS), where on repeated occasions the GAO[ii] and others have suggested consolidating the agencies or at least specific areas of intersection between them.

Of course a true comprehensive, coordinated housing policy will require reform of the GSEs—or as previously stated, fixing the parts of the housing finance system that were and are broken while enhancing the parts of the system that work. Although housing finance reform may not be the first focus of the new Congress and Administration, significant steps could be taken in the near-term to encourage greater reliance of private capital and market discipline in the housing finance system by establishing clarity about the roles of the different agencies in facilitating homeownership and by providing much greater transparency at both FHA and the GSEs about how these agencies price credit risk. Again, this difference between agencies is particularly sharp in the case of FHA and the conventional lending space with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which use private capital, such as private MI, to insure against a portion of first-loss on high LTV loans. However, in this case, a single borrower either pays a premium rate determined on an average basis (FHA) or a risk-based one (private MI), with the risk-based premium driven by “asset requirements” established by the government-guaranteed GSEs but not by the government-guaranteed FHA. So while there continues to be bipartisan support for reducing the government’s footprint and reducing taxpayers’ exposure to mortgage credit risk, the current market’s inconsistencies are considerable roadblocks to achieving that goal.

There are a number of different proposals for reforming the housing finance system, but most essential going forward is that Congress fixes one of the greatest flaws of the previous and current system, namely that government-backed entities – whether completely government controlled such as FHA or quasi-government such as the GSEs – should not set rules for and then compete on an unlevel playing field with the private market. These entities should perform explicit functions that foster greater participation by the private market, should promote a race-to-the top and not a race-to-the-bottom, and should be highly regulated. They should also be completely transparent in the credit risk they guarantee and how they price that credit risk. Transparency about how government prices credit risk would facilitate the greatest level of liquidity in these markets, and for credit risk transfer would foster an understanding of how these transactions are priced and the best execution for each. Finally, providing greater transparency will help end a structure where only a few agencies control the housing finance system because of their ownership of proprietary data, systems, and pricing. In conservatorship, the GSEs have an explicit guarantee on their Mortgage Backed Securities from the federal government. Therefore, until comprehensive housing finance reform is realized, critical steps could be taken now to improve transparency and foster greater understanding by market participants that will ultimately better inform borrowers. More transparent pricing will benefit lenders, investors, and most of all consumers and taxpayers.

As stated by former FHFA Director Ed DeMarco, housing finance reform “remains the great unfinished business from the Great Recession.” The complexity and political nature of the issues surrounding housing finance reform make it a daunting task to be sure, but the new Administration and Congress have a unique opportunity to make the housing finance system more coordinated, transparent, and disciplined to work for taxpayers and borrowers.

[i] Federal agencies involved with housing finance policy and regulation include FHFA, HUD, VA, USDA, Treasury, NCUA, and CFPB

[ii] U.S. Government Accountability Office, HOME MORTGAGE GUARANTEES: Issues to Consider in Evaluating Opportunities to Consolidate Two Overlapping Single-Family Programs (September 29, 2016).  See http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/680151.pdf.

Op-Ed: GSEs need greater taxpayer protection upfront

Posted on by Lindsey Johnson

 

 

 


By Lindsey Johnson

Eight years after taxpayers provided them with $187 billion, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two of the largest backers of mortgages, remain under government control. While these government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) are healthier today thanks to new safeguards that have improved the stability of the mortgage finance system, the goal is to put the GSEs on a stable footing for the long term.

Efforts to reduce government, and therefore taxpayers’, risk exposure by positioning more private capital in a so-called “first loss” position ahead of the GSEs are widely supported. Several approaches are being tested through an initiative called credit risk transfer (CRT). The vast majority of CRT today occurs after the loans have already been purchased by the GSEs where they hold the risk for some time before selling a portion of it “on the back end” to a third party—primarily asset managers and hedge funds. While it’s positive to see the GSEs seek to shift risk, how this transfer occurs is a question currently vexing policymakers. And, how it is done will have significant implications for the future of housing finance.

The GSEs’ regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), recently sought input on CRT, looking specifically at front-end approaches where the risk is transferred to a third party before it reaches the GSEs’ balance sheets. While this may seem novel, there’s a highly effective form of front-end risk transfer that has existed for six decades: private mortgage insurance (MI). MI is a good answer to policymakers’ question of how to further protect taxpayers while ensuring first-time buyers have access to home financing.

Typically, on conventional GSE loans with down payments less than 20 percent, MI covers the first losses before it ever reaches the GSEs. This front-end risk protection has paid off. Since the GSEs were placed into conservatorship, MIs have covered more than $50 billion in claims to the GSEs—risk that taxpayers didn’t need to cover. MI not only protects taxpayers, it helps creditworthy families without large down payments qualify for a mortgage. In the past year, MI has helped more than 795,000 Americans purchase or refinance their home—nearly half were first-time homebuyers and more than 40 percent had incomes below $75,000.

Private MI works—today it covers up to 35 percent of the value of a loan, and because it transfers credit risk at the loan’s origination, it’s a pure form of front-end risk share. The question being considered by FHFA now relates to the expansion of the current levels of private MI. This deeper level of MI can be done in a way that is fair for lenders of all sizes, achieves the objective of reducing taxpayer exposure, and offers pricing transparency, so if there is a savings to the consumer, it can be realized.

Here are some things FHFA and the GSEs should consider for CRT:

First, the housing finance market is cyclical. Therefore, FHFA needs to make sure all CRT structures will be available in the next downturn. Through the financial crisis mortgage insurers continued to pay claims and insure new home loans. The structure of mortgage insurers contributes to economic stability for a number of reasons, including that MI companies engage in countercyclical reserving. This means they reserve premiums collected during favorable economic times so they can pay increased claims during downturns. Mortgage insurers provide credit loss protection exclusively on residential mortgages and, unlike other forms of CRT, won’t exit should the market experience volatility or stress.

Second, new GSE requirements established robust standards for the industry’s capital levels, business activities, risk management, underwriting practices, quality control, lender approval, and monitoring activities. All of this makes MI different from other capital market structures, which disappeared during the crisis and have yet to return in any meaningful volume.

Third, the mortgage finance system cannot return to being controlled by, and benefitting only a few. Unlike other forms of CRT, deeper MI coverage can be made available to lenders without any biases or advantages based on size or volume. It’s simple to implement too, as it is operationally consistent for lenders to use as current mortgage insurance. MI also doesn’t require the posting of collateral, a challenge for some smaller lenders.

Finally, transparency is fundamental to better inform market participants, to make clear if there’s any borrower benefit among the different transaction types, and to enable the formation of a deep market for these transactions. MI pricing is transparent. Rate cards are standardized and published and other reports, including securities and state insurance filings, are publicly available to lenders and borrowers.

Until Congress determines the future of housing finance, FHFA is right to explore ways to transfer more risk away from taxpayers. However, not all risk sharing programs are equally effective. Deeper MI can help our nation build a stronger, more stable housing finance system that protects taxpayers and facilitates the homeownership for millions of Americans.

A version of this article originally appeared in The Hill on October 20, 2016.

Article: Private Mortgage Insurers Make Their Mark on the Industry

Posted on by dcadmin

Private mortgage insurance companies, although few in number, play an important role in the housing finance system by creating sustainable homeownership for borrowers and taking on GSE credit risk.

Lindsey Johnson, President and Executive Director of U.S. Mortgage Insurers (USMI) offered MReport an inside view into the world of private mortgage insurers and how they are completely changing the mortgage game.

MReport: How has the private mortgage insurance (PMI) industry changed and evolved within the housing space?

Johnson: When I think about how our industry is evolving, two key words that come to mind are: reliability and relevance. As with every other financial services industry player, private mortgage insurance has increased capital levels, enhanced counterparty standards, and changed our master policy agreements to give better clarity and certainty of coverage when our claims are paid. Wehave also had new entrants into the system. During the crisis, we had three new mortgage insurers enter into the market and are competitive players along with the three members who were formerly in the industry. We also continue to operate in the affordability space by allowing borrowers who otherwise might not be able to attain the home they want because they are unable to meet the down payment requirements. We continue to increase our reliability because we have enhanced our capital, enhanced the master policy agreement, and we are positioned to provide greater risk protection to the GSEs and lenders in the future.

As the marketplace continues to evolve, there seems to be broad consensus that the GSEs need to maintain and grow their credit risk transfer programs. They continue to explore ways that they are going to shed risk. Mortgage insurers are  adapting to be well-positioned to take  additional credit risk away from the GSEs. Mortgage insurers continue to be one of the few sources out there that the GSEs can shift risk to today and are also one of the few counterparties with staying power. We are going to be there to take credit risk away from the GSEs in the good and bad economic times. In that sense, mortgage insurers continue to prove that we are as relevant today as ever.

MReport: What are some the biggest issues that PMIs face in the mortgage industry today?

Johnson: Today, some of our greatest challenges as mortgage insurers stem from the effect of government programs, including FHA and even the GSEs, where certain policies responding to the crisis, such as FHA’s expansion into the conventional market and the GSEs addition of LLPAs, have not been retracted even after eight years post-crisis. Mortgage insurers continue to be the most competitive option in many circumstances in the conventional market. We are competing with government, oftentimes when our regulatory requirements and standards were increased almost uniformly across the board, while many government programs have not had those standards enhanced or even updated. That creates challenges for all private market players.

MReport: What are some of the largest successes private mortgage insurers are experiencing?

Johnson: We continue to do our primary business very well. In the past year, mortgage insurers expanded consumer access to mortgage finance credit to more than 725,000 new homeowners. Half of those that were served by mortgage insurers were first-time homebuyers and nearly 40 percent of those were borrowers with incomes below $75,000. That is significant and something that mortgage insurers are very proud of. These are borrowers that would most likely not be able to make a typical, substantial down payment of 20 percent that is required. They are appraised by lenders as having that higher credit risk without a down payment and we know that typically borrowers are far less likely to default on their mortgage when there is a down payment. Coming up with that down payment can be a huge hurdle for homeownership. We did the calculation  to determine that if mortgage insurance wasn’t an option, how long would it take for borrowers to save for that 20 percent down payment, and we found that it could take about 20 years for the average firefighter or school teacher to save for a down payment.

MReport: How can PMIs attract borrowers that cannot afford a down payment and get them into homes? What benefit do PMIs offer?

Johnson: It begins with education. A point that often gets missed is that unlike FHA or other options that require a higher interest rate or more fees for the entire life of the loan, private mortgage insurance is paid by the borrower and is cancelable once there is a certain amount of equity built up in the home. It’s also important to understand that we continue to be in the marketplace, we continue to be very competitive with the other options out there, and we continue to be one of the safest options for individuals to get into homes where we create sustainability in the marketplace. For the GSEs, we continue to be one of the most reliable counterparties.

MReport: What piece of advice can you offer other PMIs in the industry?

Johnson: This industry has a great story to tell. It’s one of making homeownership possible for many people that would otherwise be unable to obtain the home they want. We continue to be extremely relevant in today’s housing finance system. So many of the issues that we face today we have faced in the past, and mortgage insurers have been a tested means  to serve as a credit enhancement for borrowers to get into these homes. The housing finance system will continue to evolve, and mortgage insurance is going to be a key component and a very important credit enhancement option. Mortgage insurers are dedicated to the housing finance system and are there in both good and bad economic times. As an industry, we have to continue to tell that story.

To read the entire MReport, click here.

Statement: Polling Finds Majority Supports Using Private Capital to Reliably Reduce GSE Taxpayer Risks

Posted on by dcadmin

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(February 16, 2016) Last week saw more activity demonstrating the value of private Mortgage Insurance as a reliable way to enhance access to mortgage credit for consumers and protect taxpayers against housing losses, particularly through greater front end risk sharing by the GSEs:

  • USMI released a new fact sheet showing how MIs are strong counterparties that reliably transfer mortgage credit risk
  • DS News reported on new polling from USMI showing strong national support for reducing GSE and taxpayer risk through increased reliance on private capital
  • USMI Chairman and Genworth MI CEO Rohit Gupta appeared at the Urban Institute /Core Logic Forum on risk sharing, “Credit Risk Transfer: Making a Successful Program Even Better.”
    • Gupta talked about the enhanced reliability and higher capital standards for MI, and how deeper MI coverage on GSE loans would almost double the amount of loss protection for the GSEs and taxpayers
    • Urban’s Laurie Goodman talked about an advantage of front end risk sharing with MI to pass savings through to consumers

U.S. Mortgage Insurers (USMI) is dedicated to a housing finance system backed by private capital that enables access to housing finance for borrowers while protecting taxpayers. Mortgage insurance offers an effective way to make mortgage credit available to more people. USMI is ready to help build the future of homeownership.  Learn more at www.usmi.org.

Newsletter: December 2015

Posted on by dcadmin

USMI Header 750 - New Logo

Recap: Making Housing Finance System More Sustainable and Reducing Taxpayer Exposure Through Increased Front End Risk Sharing

Last week, we saw several indications that momentum is growing to make the housing finance system more sustainable and reduce taxpayer exposure by further de-risking the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with increased front end risk sharing, in particular, by expanding private Mortgage Insurance (MI) coverage.

  • Bipartisan members of Congress are urging FHFA to take additional steps to expand front end risk sharing. Representatives Stivers (R-OH) and Moore (D-WI) expressed concern over the “lack of balance between ‘front-end’ and ‘back-end’ risk sharing.”  And Representatives Luetkemeyer (R-MO) and McHenry (R-NC) sent a letter to FHFA urging them to “require the Enterprises to also explore and engage in diverse forms of front-end credit risk sharing.”  The House letters join a bipartisan Senate letter signed by Mark Warner (D-VA), Bob Corker (R-TN), Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND), Mike Crapo (R-ID), Jon Tester (D-MT), and Dean Heller (R-NV) which also encourages FHFA to expand and better define the development of credit risk transfer programs.
  • The Mortgage Bankers Association sent a letter to FHFA Director Mel Watt urging FHFA to require greater use of up-front risk sharing by the GSEs, particularly with deeper private mortgage insurance (MI) coverage, to de-risk loans before they are acquired by the GSEs.
  • Doug Holtz-Eakin of American Action Forum stated that de-risking the GSEs through greater use of private mortgage insurance (PMI) “represents a step toward finally resolving the structural flaws that contributed to the [financial] crisis.”
  • Respected analysts Laurie Goodman, James Parrott and Mark Zandi issued a joint paper – Delivering on the Promise of Risk Sharing – which provides a very thorough analysis of all the options, including up front risk sharing with MI.
  • USMI president Lindsey Johnson was in the news, with an op-ed in The American Banker and a Q&A in DS News, both on risk sharing.

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U.S. Mortgage Insurers (USMI) is dedicated to a housing finance system backed by private capital that enables access to housing finance for borrowers while protecting taxpayers. Mortgage insurance offers an effective way to make mortgage credit available to more people. USMI is ready to help build the future of homeownership.  Learn more at www.usmi.org.

 

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Article: Risk Sharing Transactions: Front End vs. Back End

Posted on by dcadmin

USMI president Lindsey Johnson recently sat down for a Q&A discussion on risk sharing with DS News. Below is a portion of her discussion.

Lindsey Johnson currently serves as U.S. Mortgage Insurers (USMI) President and Executive Director. Johnson previously served as a Director on PwC’s public policy team, where she engaged policymakers on key public policy issues that impacted the firm. Prior to joining PwC, Lindsey was a former member of the Senate Banking Committee staff as the Minority Staff Director for the Senate Banking Committee’s National Security and International Trade and Finance (NSITF) Subcommittee, and served as Senior Policy Advisor to Senator Mark Kirk (R-Illinois), focusing on noteworthy banking, housing finance reform, and insurance legislation.

What is the difference between front-end risk sharing and back-end risk sharing?

The biggest difference is the fact that upfront risk sharing transactions de-risk the GSEs, or transfer the credit risk from the loans, before they hit the GSE’s balance sheets. Back-end CRTs require the GSEs to warehouse that risk for a period of time, and the GSEs decide what credit risk they’re going to offlay and who the counterparties will be. USMI members have done both, so we would not say that back-end transactions are bad. We actually are very supportive. However, one of the drawbacks or distinctions between the two, specifically back-end CRTs, is that the risk is on the balance sheets on the GSEs is subject to credit swings, which is partially what happened with the widening of the credit spreads at Freddie Mac last month when they experienced a loss.

Other challenges and drawbacks to the back-end transactions is that there is not a lot of pricing transparency to date. Also, smaller institutions have not been able to participate in the transactions. Front-end transactions provider a lot greater pricing transparency and can be accessible for the vast majority of lenders of all types and sizes, so that’s one of the benefits of front-end transactions.

Why do you think the GSEs have engaged in mostly back-end risk sharing to this point?

The FHFA reported in their white paper back in August that since 2012, the GSEs have purchased approximately $3 trillion in mortgage loans, of which just over around 20 percent of the loans—about $667 billion in unpaid principal balance—has been transferred via riskshare, but out of that, less than 1 percent of the risk has been transferred via front-end risk sharing. I think part of the reason, and it’s pretty understandable if this is the case, is that the GSEs can control the process in the entire back-end transfer process. Especially when you consider early versions of STACR (Structured Agency Credit Risk) and CAS (Connecticut Avenue Series) transactions, where they were really designed to move large portions of unexpected loss from the GSEs balance sheet, it makes sense because they were experimenting in the beginning.

Today, the GSEs are a lot better at risk transfer. The products and the markets themselves have started to evolve, and the GSEs are starting to transfer both expected loss and catastrophic loss. The products have evolved and the market players themselves are able to transfer this risk pretty seamlessly. It’s becoming a part of their everyday routine. So at least in the beginning, it seems, they were experimenting and trying to control the entire process.

Now that we have a much better sense of how this works operationally and how credit risk transfer can work both on the back end and the front end, I think we should start focusing on transactions that are scalable and repeatable just as FHFA continues to say they want to do. Also, they should lay the groundwork for a system that is accessible to a majority of market players. It doesn’t make sense to return to a system that advantages some market players over others. Knowing that comprehensive housing finance reform isn’t coming in the near term, we think it’s imperative that FHFA and the GSEs adhere to principles that nearly every industry and consumer group, as well as policy makers, have said are really critical to the housing finance system going forward. They need to begin laying the groundwork now. Those principles are very broad, of course: having greater private capital, which they are very focused on; greater transparency on pricing, and demonstrating the impact to the borrower; and then equitable access for smaller lenders, and lenders of all sizes and types in mortgage finance. So having a greater balance of front-end transactions is something that we are really pushing FHFA and the GSEs to experiment with in 2016.

To read the entire Q&A discussion with USMI president Lindsey Johnson click here

Newsletter: March 2015

Posted on by dcadmin

The recent decision by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to lower annual mortgage insurance premiums has renewed the debate about the complementary roles of private Mortgage Insurance (MI) and the FHA government mortgage insurance program.

Below are links to background materials on this topic and excerpts from a related hearing before the House Financial Services Committee Housing and Insurance Subcommittee, which included testimony by Rohit Gupta, President and CEO of Genworth Mortgage Insurance and Chair of U.S. Mortgage Insurers (USMI) and other housing finance experts.