Newsletter: March 2017

Here is a roundup of recent news in the housing finance industry, including the unveiling of USMI’s new logo to commemorate 60 years of making homeownership possible through private mortgage insurance and housing policy developments in Congress and in the executive branch.

  • The private mortgage insurance industry turns 60. USMI unveiled its new logo to commemorate 60 years of private mortgage insurance (MI) making homeownership possible for millions of Americans. Since 1957, private MI has served as a reliable and affordable method of expanding homeownership, while simultaneously protecting American taxpayers and the government from exposure to mortgage credit risk. Stay tuned for more activities!
  • USMI and others send letter to Congress on g-fees. Scotsman Guide reported on a letter sent by USMI and 13 other industry trade groups to Reps. Mark Sanford (R-SC) and Brad Sherman (D-CA) on a bill they introduced to ensure that guarantee fees (g-fees) charged by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the “GSEs”) are used solely to insure against the credit risk of home mortgages. In 2016, the mortgage finance industry successfully fought off a legislative proposal to use g-fees collected by the GSEs to fund highway projects. The letter reads: “G-fees are a critical risk management tool used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to protect against losses from loans that default. Increasing g-fees for other purposes imposes an unjustified burden on homeowners who would pay for any increase through higher monthly payments for the life of their loan. … whenever Congress has considered using g-fees to cover the cost of programs unrelated to housing, we’ve informed lawmakers that homeownership cannot, and must not, be used as the nation’s piggybank. By preventing g-fees from being scored as a funding offset, H.R. 916 gives lawmakers a vital tool to prevent homeowners from footing the bill for unrelated spending. We are grateful to you for introducing this bipartisan legislation and urge its consideration by the House.”
  • Carson confirmed as HUD Secretary. On March 2, Dr. Ben Carson was confirmed as the new Secretary for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). USMI released a statement congratulating Secretary Carson on his confirmation and welcoming the opportunity to work with the Secretary and his team to promote a stronger and more equitable mortgage finance system, as well as an expanded role for private capital.
  • Investopedia has good video explaining MI. USMI’s website features a new video courtesy of Investopedia to help people better understand what private MI is and how it helps people who cannot afford a 20 percent down payment to buy a home. To watch the video, click here.

Newsletter: February 2017

Here is a roundup of recent news in the housing finance industry, including USMI’s release of its 2017 policy priorities and housing finance reform principles, industry outreach to the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) on GSE activities, and the recent news of increases in Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage delinquencies:

  • USMI released housing finance reform principles that address ways the housing finance system can be put on a more sustainable path. These principles allow creditworthy borrowers to have access to affordable mortgage credit without exposing taxpayers and the government to housing related credit risks. These principles include:
    • Protecting taxpayers by allowing private capital to absorb all credit losses in front of any government guaranty
    • Promoting stability in a reformed housing finance system
    • Ensuring accessibility to mortgage finance for creditworthy borrowers and participation by lenders of all sizes and types
    • Fostering transparency through a consistent and coordinated approach to the federal governments’ housing policy among all agencies and entities
  • USMI released its public policy priorities for 2017, which are dedicated to fostering sustainable homeownership while significantly limiting credit risk to taxpayers and the government. These policy priorities include:
    • Enabling access to homeownership and affordable mortgage credit with MI
      • Setting and using GSE fees
      • Extending and preserving tax deductibility of MI
    • Reducing taxpayer risk with MI
      • Establishing coordinated housing policy
      • Establishing complementary roles for the Federal Housing Administration and MI
      • Strengthening the role of MI in comprehensive reform legislation
      • Expanding the use of “Deeper Cover” MI in GSE-risk sharing
  • In a joint letter, USMI and eight other financial trade groups wrote to FHFA Director Mel Watt and urged the agency to engage with industry stakeholders before moving forward with evaluating new or alternative credit score models used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for conventional mortgage loans. The joint letter reads:“As the Federal Housing Finance Agency (‘FHFA’) moves forward with evaluating new/alternative models, we request that FHFA engage more openly and broadly with industry through a public forum, provide relevant data and information from the Enterprises to help inform industry participants about the potential impact of new credit score models, and share your assessment of fair lending risks posed by contemplated changes. … Given the significant implications that the various options could have on borrowers and our industries, our associations urge FHFA to broaden the input from key industry participants to help reach the most suitable option to expand credit while promoting sustainable homeownership.”
  • The National Association of Realtors (NAR) sent a letter to FHFA Director Mel Watt regarding the recent news that Fannie Mae will obtain a billion dollars’ worth of loans to finance its purchase of single family homes that will be rented out in markets with limited supply. The letter states:“Rather than focusing on allowing well-qualified Americans to build wealth through affordable mortgages options, Fannie Mae is actively financing large institutions to compete with them. These investors do not expand the affordable housing stock. Rather, in this limited market they drive up the price of rents and remove affordable inventory from the hands of American homeowners. … At a time of a historically low homeownership rate, our nation needs the GSEs to bolster homeownership opportunities for millions of responsible, middle class American families, not funding special interest deals with Wall Street financial firms that take away those opportunities.”Several House Democrats also wrote a letter to Director Watt expressing their concerns over the deal, which they say chases profits at the expense of Fannie Mae’s primary mission of boosting U.S. homeownership.
  • The House Financial Services Committee issued a statement regarding the spike in delinquencies on mortgages backed by the FHA at the end of 2016. Mortgage delinquencies at the FHA jumped in the 4th quarter of 2016 for the first time since 2006, with the delinquency rate increasing to 9.02 percent. In the statement, Chairman Jeb Hensarling stated that the data “makes it clear that President Trump was absolutely right to undo the previous administration’s irresponsible action.”

Blog: What HUD’s Suspension of FHA MIP Rate Cut Really Means

On Friday, January 20, 2017, the new Administration’s U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) suspended a January 9 announcement by the outgoing Obama Administration’s HUD and its Federal Housing Administration (FHA) regarding a planned reduction in FHA mortgage insurance premiums (MIP) for borrowers. (Note: the FHA is a 100% government-backed mortgage insurance program that, just like private mortgage insurance, guarantees mortgage lenders against default risk particularly for home loans originated with low down payments.)

The FHA MIP reduction was to take effect on January 27. Given the haste of this announcement, the incoming Trump Administration at HUD suspended this decision as to provide incoming officials sufficient time to better understand the potential impact—good and bad—such a reduction would have on the market.

There have been a number of reports and opinions shared on the recent suspension—and not all of them accurate. Below are additional facts and information on the decision to suspend the not-yet implemented premium reduction.  We hope you find it helpful. Please don’t hesitate to let us know if you have any follow up questions. Feel free to email us at media@usmi.org.

1. HUD’s decision does not raise the cost of homeownership in any way. The proposed FHA MIP reduction was announced by outgoing Obama HUD officials on January 9 and was scheduled to take effect on January 27. This proposed 25 basis points (bps) reduction has been suspended and, therefore, means there is no change to FHA premiums for new mortgage originations or refinances FHA mortgages. Since FHA premiums remain the same, the costs of an FHA-backed mortgage do not increase at all.

While some have been quick to criticize HUD’s recent action with politically-charged rhetoric, this is not a political or partisan issue. As noted in a January 24 Washington Post editorial, “the Obama administration itself increased this [FHA] fee four times between 2010 and 2013” before lowering the fee by 50 bps in 2015. The Washington Post goes on to say, “given recent financial instability—both at FHA and in housing generally—the new administration was perfectly justified in undoing it.”

2. With or without an FHA-insured option, there is wide availability today of low down payment mortgages backed by private mortgage insurance. Homebuyers have options; this includes low down payment mortgages with private mortgage insurance (MI). Unlike FHA-backed mortgages, the risk contained in loans guaranteed by private MI is not 100% exposed to the government and taxpayers. Private mortgage insurers put their own capital ahead of taxpayers to back mortgages that help homebuyers qualify for mortgage financing despite a low down payment or imperfect credit.

3. When comparing apples to apples, a low down payment mortgage backed by private MI is a better deal for homebuyers compared to FHA. First, cash for a down payment can be less for a private MI conventional mortgage compared to an FHA loan. Second, private MI can be cancelled thus lowering the monthly bill while FHA premiums generally must be paid for the full life of the mortgage.

In contrast to FHA insurance, private MI can be cancelled once borrowers have established 20% equity (through payments or home price appreciation). Ninety percent of borrowers cancel their private mortgage insurance within the first 60 months (five years). Why pay FHA insurance for another 25 years on a 30-year mortgage if it’s not necessary? The savings over time are significant.

The minimum down payment for FHA is 3.5% while a conventional private MI-backed mortgage can be originated with as little as 3% down. On a $234,900 home purchase (national median in December 2016), with a 4.25% interest rate for conventional and 4% for FHA, the FHA loan requires $1,175 more for down payment than the private MI loan. This goes to show that even with a higher interest rate the conventional loan still may be a better deal.

4. Experts (see below) point out that the FHA was stretched to the brink for nearly a decade, through the financial crisis, ultimately requiring a $1.7 billion taxpayer bailout. These experts argue that the capital levels required of FHA to shield taxpayers against losses, which is a thin 2% to begin with and has been underwater for several years, should not be thinned-out so quickly after it’s been restored back to health.

  • Housing policy experts at the Urban Institute debunk some of the quick claims about the negative impact of this HUD action. In a new blog they state: “A close look at the planned price reduction, however, reveals that the impact on the market would have been small and retaining the current price to help shore up FHA funds for a rainy day is a more prudent choice.” They also caution that the new lending volume at FHA would not come from unserved borrowers or homebuyers left on the sidelines, but instead borrowers already served by the low down payment conventional market.
  • On the opposite side of the political spectrum, scholars at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) agree with Urban Institute on the forestalled FHA premium reduction. AEI scholars note that the last time FHA cut fees in 2015 it did not result in serving a new, previously unserved universe of homebuyers. AEI found, “almost half of these buyers— attracted by FHA’s lower monthly payments—were poached from other government agencies, mainly Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. We also estimate that another third of the 180,000 buyers would have entered the market regardless of the lower premium, because an improving economy was raising incomes and lowering unemployment across the nation.”

5. Given privately insured mortgages are widely available and therefore homebuyers have options beyond FHA, the government program does not need to potentially increase risks to the American taxpayers. Below is a statement by Lindsey Johnson, USMI President and Executive director.

“HUD’s action allows the incoming Administration appropriate time to begin its work and to determine if an FHA mortgage insurance premium reduction is needed, and how it might expose taxpayers to undue risk. Given the wide availability of MI-backed low down payment mortgages and the fact that private MI is a better deal for borrowers over FHA since it can be cancelled, which in turn lowers monthly payments while FHA insurance must be paid for the life of the loan, there is no need for FHA to undercut the private market. While the FHA serves an important role in the housing market, it has expanded its footprint dramatically since the financial crisis and should instead remain focused on its core mission of serving underserved borrowers. USMI has and will continue to work with policymakers and housing officials to establish a more coordinated housing policy that will ensure broad access to low down payment lending while reducing the government’s footprint in housing and protecting taxpayers.”

Statement: FHA Mortgage Insurance Premium Reduction

WASHINGTON The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) announced today it will reduce its mortgage insurance premiums (MIPs) by 25 basis points. In November 2016, a HUD official stated there would be no additional MIPs cuts following its annual report to Congress on the financial status of its Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMIF), which showed it had finally reached its required capital levels after nearly a decade of severe stress. The following statement can be attributed to Lindsey Johnson, USMI President and Executive Director:

“While the MMIF is making needed improvements to its financial health, now is the time to establish a more coordinated housing policy to ensure broad access to low down payment lending while reducing the government’s footprint in housing and protecting taxpayers. Arbitrary reductions to the FHA’s MIP is bad policy because it pulls borrowers who would otherwise be served by the conventional Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac market, which is backed by private mortgage insurance for first losses versus the taxpayer. Taxpayers are currently exposed to $1.3 trillion in mortgage risk outstanding at FHA. As a result, and unless Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac make commensurate fee adjustments to reflect the FHA decision, the government will likely assume increased amounts of mortgage credit risk.

“We agree with views of past FHA commissioners who contend private capital should play a leading role in guaranteeing low down payment mortgage credit risk so the government and taxpayer don’t have to. Given the wide availability of MI-backed mortgages, the FHA does not need to undercut private capital. USMI continues to believe that FHA serves a very important role, but it has expanded its footprint dramatically since the financial crisis and should instead remain focused on its core mission of serving underserved borrowers. FHA and the GSEs should be much more coordinated to promote broad sustainable homeownership.

“The last time FHA reduced its premiums in 2015, the move resulted in a high volume of FHA loan refinancing versus new mortgage origination, in essence maintaining the same borrowers and home loans while collecting less in insurance premiums. In other words, the same FHA mortgage credit risk but with less protection. This will result in a less financially resilient FHA and increased risk for taxpayers.”

For the consumer, private MI offers distinct advantages over FHA mortgage insurance. For instance, unlike FHA, private MI can be cancelled once approximately 20 percent equity is achieved either through payment or home price appreciation. This step immediately lowers the monthly mortgage for the homeowner.

Private mortgage insurers, who put their own capital at risk to mitigate mortgage credit risk, provided over $50 billion in credit risk protection since the financial crisis to the GSEs and did not take any taxpayer bailout. The market has been strengthened since the financial crisis as all MIs have all implemented significant new capital requirements, or the Private Mortgage Insurer Eligibility Requirements (PMIERs), which are stress-tested financial and capital requirements established by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Housing Finance Agency, enhancing MI’s ability to assume mortgage credit risk in the future.

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U.S. Mortgage Insurers (USMI) is dedicated to a housing finance system backed by private capital that enables access to housing finance for borrowers while protecting taxpayers. Mortgage insurance offers an effective way to make mortgage credit available to more people. USMI is ready to help build the future of homeownership. Learn more at www.usmi.org.

Blog: An affordable way to qualify for a home loan without that big down payment

For many Americans, the biggest hurdle in buying a home is the 20 percent down payment they think is required for mortgage approval. According to a recent survey by the National Association of Realtors, 34 percent of respondents believe they need more than 20 percent.

Meanwhile, low down payment mortgages account for a significant amount of home buying annually.

Families with down payments as low as 3 or 5 percent have been able to purchase a home thanks to private mortgage insurance (MI) for 60 years. Since 1957, MI has helped 25 million families become homeowners. In the past year alone, MI helped more than 795,000 homeowners purchase or refinance a mortgage. Nearly half were first time homebuyers and more than 40 percent had incomes below $75,000.

How MI works

Mortgage insurance is simple. In addition to the other parts of mortgage underwriting process — such as verifying employment and determining the borrower’s ability to afford the monthly payment — lenders traditionally required 20 percent down to ensure the borrower had some of their own money committed before the bank would provide a loan. This is where MI enters, bridging the down payment divide to qualify borrowers for mortgage financing.

Benefits of MI

  • It helps you buy a home, sooner. For the average firefighter or school teacher, it could take 20 years to save the typical down payment. Private mortgage insurers help borrowers qualify with as little as 3 percent down.
  • It’s temporary, leading to lower monthly payments. MI can be cancelled once you build 20 percent equity, either through payments or home price appreciation — typically in the first five to seven years. This is not the case for FHA loans, the federal government’s form of MI. The majority of which require MI for the life of the loan.
  • It provides several flexible payment options. Your lender can offer several options for MI payment; the most common is paid monthly along with your mortgage.
  • It’s tax-deductible. Subject to income limits, MI premiums are tax deductible — similar to interest paid on a mortgage. In 2014, 4 million taxpayers benefited from this deduction with the average being $1,402.

MI is a stable, cost effective way to obtain low down payment mortgages, and offers distinct benefits to borrowers. It’s been a cornerstone of the U.S. housing market for decades, providing millions the opportunity to own homes despite financial barriers. Ask your lender for low down payment options using MI.

Newsletter: December 2019

Here is a roundup of news surrounding recent developments in President-elect Donald Trump’s housing policy, key legislative proposals and also reports on the benefits of front-end credit risk sharing with deep cover mortgage insurance, and a new USMI blog post on unnecessary upfront risk fees (loan-level price adjustments) imposed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:

  • Nominee for Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Announced. Earlier this week, President-elect Donald Trump announced that he would nominate Dr. Ben Carson as his Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
  • GSE Credit Risk Transfer Legislation Introduced in Congress. HousingWire and American Banker report that on December 8 Reps. Ed Royce (R-Calif.) and Gwen Moore (D-Wisc.) introduced a new bill in the House of Representatives that would require the GSEs to offload more credit risk onto the private sector. The Taxpayer Protections and Market Access for Mortgage Finance Act of 2016 (H.R. 6487) seeks to require Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSEs) to transfer more credit risk through front-end credit risk transfer (CRT) transactions to mitigate losses and risks to taxpayers and the federal government. In addition to other provisions, H.R. 6487 calls for a five-year pilot program to increase the amount of risk transferred away from the government before it reaches the GSEs’ balance sheets by using front-end CRT with private mortgage insurance (MI). This front-end MI-based CRT method is consistent with recommendations to the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) from USMI and others, and builds upon the current, effective use of private mortgage insurance in the GSE system that has been in practice for decades.
  • Treasury Secretary Nominee Calls for GSEs to Exit Conservatorship. In recent comments, President-elect Donald Trump’s nominee for Treasury Secretary, Steve Mnuchin, called for the GSEs to exit conservatorship, adding that government ownership of the companies displaces private capital in the housing finance system and that the Trump administration “will get it done reasonably fast.” President-elect Trump’s transition team noted that the need to structurally reform the GSEs has bipartisan agreement.
  • Housing Expert Extols Benefits of Front-End Credit Risk Transfer and Deeper Cover Mortgage Insurance. In a recent article, Faith Schwartz, a housing finance policy expert who has worked extensively with the federal government in the US housing market, wrote on the benefits of front-end credit risk transfer (CRT), including through the use of deeper cover mortgage insurance (MI). Schwartz notes that front-end CRT and deeper cover MI allow for greater transparency, more options in a counter-cyclical volatile market, inclusive institutional partners and borrower process, and allows the GSEs to reach their goals in de-risking their credit guarantee. Schwartz concludes her article by saying: “In summary, whether it is recourse to a lending institution or participation in the front-end MI cost structure, pricing this risk at origination will continue to bring forward price discovery and transparency. This means the consumer and lender will be closer to the true credit costs of origination. With experience pricing and executing on CRT, it may become clearer where the differential cost of credit lies. The additional impact of driving more front-end CRT will be scalability and less process on the back-end for the GSE’s. By leveraging the front-end model, GSE’s will reach more borrowers and utilize a wider array of lending partners through this process.”
  • Consumer and Civil Rights Groups Raise Concerns about LLPAs. The MReport writes that 21 groups sent a letter to FHFA Director Mel Watt and Treasury Secretary Jack Lew on December 8 “expressing concern that too many creditworthy low- and moderate-income borrowers are being denied access to mortgage credit.” These groups state that “The increase in the Enterprises’ guarantee fees and risk-based pricing (LLPAs) has had a number of effects to varying degrees that some predicted, including more banks are holding fixed-rate loans on portfolio, more financing of lower-credit score borrowers by the Federal Housing Administration, and fewer originations to the underserved overall.”
  • ICYMI: Lindsey Johnson writes on Loan-Level Price Adjustments (LLPAs). In a new blog post, USMI President Lindsey Johnson highlights the need for the reduction or elimination of upfront risk fees (LLPAs) based on a borrower’s credit score and down payment. In the blog, Johnson explains how this risk is already protected by private mortgage insurance, paid for by the homeowner. LLPAs, which were put in place in 2008, are increasingly unnecessary following the enactment of stronger underwriting standards for privately insured mortgages and in essence double charge a borrower for the same risk. Johnson encourages the FHFA and the GSEs to continue to work to manage risk, however LLPAs have become arbitrary fees that make homeownership more expensive or puts homeownership out of reach for many middle and lower income homebuyers. USMI was part of a group of 25 organizations that wrote a letter to FHFA Director Mel Watt in June calling for FHFA and the GSEs to reduce to eliminate LLPAs.

Blog: Time to Be Transparent about Fannie and Freddie Upfront Risk Fees

Data show homeownership has become out of reach for many and that reducing or eliminating upfront fees is overdue.

By Lindsey Johnson

Eight years after the global financial crisis, the U.S. housing market still lags the recovery of the overall economy—and the homeownership rate is at a 50-year low.[1] While the new administration will have many housing related issues to address in the first few years, access to credit should not be overlooked. I was reminded of this and inspired to write this blog after reading a front page story in The Wall Street Journal on December 4 titled “Credit Restrictions Cost Home Buyers ‘Deal of a Lifetime.’[2]

Following the financial crisis, policymakers aimed to eliminate the riskiest mortgage products on the market and shore up the financials of those institutions that make up the housing industry. And, while we cannot turn our eyes away from safety and sound mortgage lending nor can we ever allow any of the riskier types of mortgages to return that led to the financial crisis, the pendulum has swung too far in some areas. To truly address concerns about consumers’ access to mortgage finance, a number of areas of government policy need to be discussed including: 1) the GSEs’ guaranty fees (“g-fees”) policy that was adopted after the financial crisis; 2) GSE Loan Level Pricing Adjustment (LLPA) fees that were added to g-fees during the crisis; 3) private mortgage insurers’ new Private Mortgage Insurer Eligibility Requirements (PMIERs) that were established by the GSEs; and 4) the Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) pricing and underwriting practices. We will explore many of these topics in future writings, but will focus on one specific aspect here—LLPAs.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac charge g-fees, which are the fees borrowers pay to have their mortgage backed by the Federal government through the GSEs. In 2008, the GSEs added LLPAs to further shield the GSEs against the risk of defaults. These crisis-era fees were levied on homebuyers in addition to other fees and costs for managing their risk, based largely on two factors—credit score and the size of their down payment—and most borrowers do not even know about these additional fees. The current president of the National Association of Realtors (NAR) put it best in an American Banker column when he stated “homebuyers are paying a steep price at the closing table in the form of unnecessary fees that, for some, put homeownership out of reach.”[3] Without being transparent about these so-called upfront risk fees, LLPAs will continue to exacerbate a serious concern over the efforts to re-balance these fees in a post-crisis environment.

Low-down payment programs are designed for families who need the help, but the impact of LLPAs on the cost of Fannie or Freddie-backed low-down payment mortgages has been chilling. The Wall Street Journal reports that, “Fannie and Freddie increased fees for riskier borrowers, widening the gap between mortgage rates available to borrowers with good and weak credit.”

This is indeed true. The Treasury Department noted in a recent report, the “credit score of the typical new mortgage borrower is nearly 40 points higher than the typical borrower in the early 2000s.” The “average credit score for those obtaining a loan backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac…in conservatorship is nearly 750”—near perfect credit. And the “loan-to-value” is 80%, which means average down payments are roughly 20% of the home purchase price. These facts are “especially sobering given the fact that more than 40% of all FICO scores nationally fall below 700.”[4] I would argue that these trends mean there are many creditworthy families of all socioeconomic backgrounds deserving of conventional mortgages who are simply unable to buy their first home!

Costs of LLPA Fees on Homebuyers and Taxpayers

LLPAs impose significant costs on homebuyers and disproportionately harm first-time homebuyers and those without large down payments. If a homebuyer puts down 5% on a $200,000 home, and the borrower has a 660 FICO score and is applying for a $190,000 mortgage, then the upfront LLPA is 2.25% on this loan. The borrower will pay for this by either bringing $4,275 additional funds to closing (190,000* 2.25%) or accepting a 0.50%-0.55% higher interest rate. That higher interest rate translates to an additional $50 per month on your mortgage payment. Over 5 years that is more than $3,000 in additional interest and over the life of the loan the borrower pays more than $18,000 in additional interest.

USMI was one of 25 organizations that wrote to FHFA Director Mel Watt in June about the need to eliminate or reduce these arbitrary crisis-era fees. Fortunately, since the financial crisis, defaults have gone down for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the fact that new underwriting rules have dramatically improved the quality of the GSE portfolio of new home loans, meaning there is a whole lot less risk on the GSEs’ books as these mortgages are performing well. Yet while the cumulative default rate has decreased from 13.7% to almost zero, GSE g-fees, which include LLPAs, have nearly tripled since the mortgage crisis. Therefore, these arbitrary fees are being imposed on borrowers, even though lending is safer and the fact that private mortgage insurance already mitigates the risk the borrower may not repay their loan. Essentially, LLPAs are double charging the borrower for the same risk. The data simply does not justify these fees anymore.

FHFA Responds…

Director Watt’s August 1 response to the 25 groups who called for FHFA and the GSEs to reduce or eliminate these LLPA fees was that “although positive developments in the mortgage market continue to occur, we believe the current g-fees and LLPAs continue to strike the risk balance.”[5] However, speaking at the MBA’s Annual Convention & Expo in October, Director Watt acknowledged that the post-2008 recovery in the housing market has been “disappointingly uneven” in many areas of the country. Not only has the recovery been slower for urban and low-income communities, but these same communities continue to have the hardest time achieving homeownership today.

NAR said in the American Banker column that the GSEs are “charging homeowners for far more risk than they [the GSEs] took on, driving tremendous profit.” The GSEs have paid more than $200 billion to the U.S. Treasury in recent years; given the GSEs are under conservatorship and are mandated to go to zero capital by 2018, the GSEs should continue to focus on providing access to credit for a broad range of borrowers.

The GSEs have a mission to “promote homeownership, especially access to affordable housing.”[6] It is time to eliminate or reduce these unnecessary fees and bring down costs for homebuyers, considering most low-down payment mortgages already come with private mortgage insurance protection—risk that Fannie and Freddie do not have to bear. Private MI has covered first loss mortgage credit risk ahead of American taxpayers for 60 years and mortgage insurers are ready to do more.


[1] Census Bureau

[2] http://www.wsj.com/articles/credit-restrictions-cost-home-buyers-deal-of-a-lifetime-1480874593

[3] http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/fees-meant-to-shield-gses-from-risk-are-hurting-homebuyers-1091054-1.html

[4] Antonio Weiss and Karen Dynan, Housing Finance Reform: Access and Affordability in Focus https://medium.com/@USTreasury/housing-finance-reform-access-and-affordability-in-focus-d559541a4cdc#.gu5ifppus

[5] Mel Watt, FHFA Letter to Stakeholders on LLPAs

[6] Chairman Ben Bernanke, ICBA Conference Speech: GSE Portfolios, Systemic Risk, and Affordable Housing https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070306a.htm

Blog: 2017: An Opportunity to Coordinate America’s Housing Policy

By Lindsey Johnson

While the housing finance system in the United States has developed into an ad hoc set of entities and programs, so has the regulatory system around it with more than seven[i] federal agencies playing a role in the formation of policy and regulation of activities for housing finance. Despite the expansive reach of the federal government in the housing finance system and the exhaustive list of government agencies regulating it, safety and soundness gaps exist, access to credit remains tight, and potential homeowners continue to fall through the cracks. Housing policy has become political in addition to being complex and has therefore created an environment where meaningful reforms are rarely achieved. However, the outcome of the historic 2016 election means that one party will control all three branches of government starting in 2017, which presents a unique opportunity to examine the underpinnings of the housing finance system and establish a more comprehensive and coordinated approach to housing policy, rather than just tinkering around the edges of the mortgage finance industry.

Here are three overarching housing considerations and recommendations for the new Congress and Administration:

  1. There is a need for more coordinated, comprehensive, and transparent federal housing policy.
  2. All attempts to reform the housing finance system should fix the parts of the system that were and are broken, while enhancing the parts of the system that work. Part of the solution to fix what is broken is to identify and address areas of inconsistency and redundancy.
  3. Private capital should play a much greater role in the housing finance system. There should be a regulatory body that sets safety and reliability rules for market players on an equitable basis. Further private capital, not government and taxpayers support, should be encouraged to provide access to credit and protect against credit risk where possible in the housing finance system.

Since major housing policy tends to be reactionary and seldom comprehensive, inconsistencies and overlaps have developed resulting in dramatic shifts between the completely private market (PLS market), the semi-government backed market (conventional market via Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), and the fully government-backed Ginnie Mae market (FHA, VA, and USDA). One such area of inconsistency is in low downpayment lending, which is increasing as a proportion of the overall residential mortgage market. Currently, a single borrower is subject to different requirements and pays different premium rates for insurance or a guarantee on a low downpayment loan under private mortgage insurance (MI), the FHA, the USDA’s Rural Housing Service, the Department of Veterans Affairs, or state Housing Finance Agency programs—even though the borrower’s risk profile remains the same.

A coordinated policy would inform how low downpayment lending in the U.S. is carried out. For example, it is common in other types of insurance such as crop, flood and terrorism insurance, to limit government programs to higher risk borrowers or to condition access to supplemental capacity by requiring some demonstration of the need for that capacity. The FHA’s current loan limits do not provide a level playing field nor is there a direct preference for a private capital alternative.  Instead, any preference is done indirectly through premium rate setting and competition, which results in an unstable policy environment. The resulting outcome is dramatic fluctuations between these mortgage finance markets, which at times is most evident between the private mortgage insurance market and the 100% government-backed mortgage insurance market at FHA. While it may seem normal to have some fluctuations during different housing cycles, the recent market fluctuations have most often been the result of competition for market share between the two. This is neither conducive for the most efficient and effective mortgage finance market nor does it ensure that borrowers are being best served. Furthermore, there are redundancies and significant overlap between several government agencies such as FHA and the Rural Housing Service (RHS), where on repeated occasions the GAO[ii] and others have suggested consolidating the agencies or at least specific areas of intersection between them.

Of course a true comprehensive, coordinated housing policy will require reform of the GSEs—or as previously stated, fixing the parts of the housing finance system that were and are broken while enhancing the parts of the system that work. Although housing finance reform may not be the first focus of the new Congress and Administration, significant steps could be taken in the near-term to encourage greater reliance of private capital and market discipline in the housing finance system by establishing clarity about the roles of the different agencies in facilitating homeownership and by providing much greater transparency at both FHA and the GSEs about how these agencies price credit risk. Again, this difference between agencies is particularly sharp in the case of FHA and the conventional lending space with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which use private capital, such as private MI, to insure against a portion of first-loss on high LTV loans. However, in this case, a single borrower either pays a premium rate determined on an average basis (FHA) or a risk-based one (private MI), with the risk-based premium driven by “asset requirements” established by the government-guaranteed GSEs but not by the government-guaranteed FHA. So while there continues to be bipartisan support for reducing the government’s footprint and reducing taxpayers’ exposure to mortgage credit risk, the current market’s inconsistencies are considerable roadblocks to achieving that goal.

There are a number of different proposals for reforming the housing finance system, but most essential going forward is that Congress fixes one of the greatest flaws of the previous and current system, namely that government-backed entities – whether completely government controlled such as FHA or quasi-government such as the GSEs – should not set rules for and then compete on an unlevel playing field with the private market. These entities should perform explicit functions that foster greater participation by the private market, should promote a race-to-the top and not a race-to-the-bottom, and should be highly regulated. They should also be completely transparent in the credit risk they guarantee and how they price that credit risk. Transparency about how government prices credit risk would facilitate the greatest level of liquidity in these markets, and for credit risk transfer would foster an understanding of how these transactions are priced and the best execution for each. Finally, providing greater transparency will help end a structure where only a few agencies control the housing finance system because of their ownership of proprietary data, systems, and pricing. In conservatorship, the GSEs have an explicit guarantee on their Mortgage Backed Securities from the federal government. Therefore, until comprehensive housing finance reform is realized, critical steps could be taken now to improve transparency and foster greater understanding by market participants that will ultimately better inform borrowers. More transparent pricing will benefit lenders, investors, and most of all consumers and taxpayers.

As stated by former FHFA Director Ed DeMarco, housing finance reform “remains the great unfinished business from the Great Recession.” The complexity and political nature of the issues surrounding housing finance reform make it a daunting task to be sure, but the new Administration and Congress have a unique opportunity to make the housing finance system more coordinated, transparent, and disciplined to work for taxpayers and borrowers.


[i] Federal agencies involved with housing finance policy and regulation include FHFA, HUD, VA, USDA, Treasury, NCUA, and CFPB

[ii] U.S. Government Accountability Office, HOME MORTGAGE GUARANTEES: Issues to Consider in Evaluating Opportunities to Consolidate Two Overlapping Single-Family Programs (September 29, 2016).  See http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/680151.pdf.

Newsletter: October 2016

On October 13, the comment period closed for the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)’s Single-Family Credit Risk Transfer (CRT) Request for Input (RFI). Below is a roundup of the comment letters submitted by USMI and numerous other housing finance organizations that expressed support behind efforts to reduce government, and therefore taxpayers’, risk exposure by positioning more private capital in a “first loss” position ahead of the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) through expanded mortgage insurance.

  • USMI notes in its comment letter the distinct advantages of front-end CRT done through expanded use of MI: “Increasing the proportion of front-end CRT in the Enterprises’ CRT strategy will advance four key objectives of a well-functioning housing finance system by ensuring that: (1) a substantial measure of private capital loss protection is available in bad times as well as good; (2) such private capital absorbs and deepens protection against first losses before the government and taxpayers; (3) all sizes and types of financial institutions have equitable access to CRT; and (4) CRT costs are transparent, thereby enhancing borrower access to affordable mortgage credit.” These comments were further highlighted in an article by the Mortgage Professional America magazine. The full comment letter is available here. USMI’s RFI fact sheet can be found here.

Following the submission of USMI’s comment letter, an op-ed by USMI President Lindsey Johnson was published in The Hill that echoes the benefits provided to the GSEs and US taxpayers by front-end CRT through expanded use of MI.

  • A number of other stakeholders and organizations also weighed in, supporting efforts to expand the use of MI:
    • Urban Institute wrote: “The GSEs could share additional credit risk through this channel by having some MIs cover a deeper level of first loss, down to, say, an effective LTV of 50%. So-called deep cover MI has several attractive features. First, it extends a structure already in wide use, making it easy for lenders of all sizes to adopt. Second, in contract to the front-end structures used to date, it is equally available to and can be equally priced for lenders of all sizes. Third, it is completely transparent… Since mortgage insurance is the only product MIs offer, they will provide capital in good times and bad.”
    • National Association of Home Builders wrote: “Deep coverage MI would allow mortgage insurance companies to reduce the Enterprises’ exposure to credit losses to as low as 50 percent of the mortgage loan amount. The Enterprises would reduce their guarantee fees on the mortgage loans commensurate with the cost of the risk they transfer to the mortgage insurers. The reduced guarantee fee charged by the Enterprises in exchange for incurring less credit risk can be passed on to consumers, reducing the cost of the mortgage loans and increasing the availability of credit.”
    • Mortgage Bankers Association wrote: “Up-front risk-sharing structures with committed mortgage market participants such as lenders, mortgage Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and mortgage insurers can distribute mortgage credit risk prior to the loan(s) being acquired by the GSEs, while offering potential borrower benefits… Well-conceived up-front risk sharing pilot programs, such as expanded lender recourse offerings, deeper mortgage insurance or other capital markets structures that are executed prior to GSE acquisition, can help the GSEs better determine which transaction structures are best able to expand the sources of private capital and withstand both the peaks and valleys in the credit cycle.” These comments were further highlighted in an article by Scotsman Guide.
    • Community Mortgage Lenders of America wrote: “There is no substitute for the depth of experience, the broad web of customer relationships and level of service that the MI industry provides to lenders, nor to the key role played by mortgage insurers in facilitating low down payment lending for borrowers whose home finance needs are served with a low down payment mortgage.”
    • Credit Union National Association wrote: “… private mortgage insurance needs to be maintained as an option as it can be utilized as an effective risk transfer strategy.”
    • Housing Policy Council wrote: “We specifically recommend that FHFA and the Enterprise test deeper mortgage insurance through a pilot program. Of the various structures discussed in the RFI, only deeper mortgage insurance has yet to be tested in the marketplace.”

In addition, last week the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a report entitled “The Effects of Increasing Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Capital.” The October 20th report came at the request of Senate Banking Committee Chairman Richard Shelby (R-AL) and analyzes a policy that would allow the GSEs to increase their capital by reducing payments to Treasury, as well as discusses the effects it would have on the federal budget and the U.S. mortgage market.