Tag: mortgage finance

Blog: 2017: An Opportunity to Coordinate America’s Housing Policy

Posted on by Lindsey Johnson

By Lindsey Johnson

While the housing finance system in the United States has developed into an ad hoc set of entities and programs, so has the regulatory system around it with more than seven[i] federal agencies playing a role in the formation of policy and regulation of activities for housing finance. Despite the expansive reach of the federal government in the housing finance system and the exhaustive list of government agencies regulating it, safety and soundness gaps exist, access to credit remains tight, and potential homeowners continue to fall through the cracks. Housing policy has become political in addition to being complex and has therefore created an environment where meaningful reforms are rarely achieved. However, the outcome of the historic 2016 election means that one party will control all three branches of government starting in 2017, which presents a unique opportunity to examine the underpinnings of the housing finance system and establish a more comprehensive and coordinated approach to housing policy, rather than just tinkering around the edges of the mortgage finance industry.

Here are three overarching housing considerations and recommendations for the new Congress and Administration:

  1. There is a need for more coordinated, comprehensive, and transparent federal housing policy.
  2. All attempts to reform the housing finance system should fix the parts of the system that were and are broken, while enhancing the parts of the system that work. Part of the solution to fix what is broken is to identify and address areas of inconsistency and redundancy.
  3. Private capital should play a much greater role in the housing finance system. There should be a regulatory body that sets safety and reliability rules for market players on an equitable basis. Further private capital, not government and taxpayers support, should be encouraged to provide access to credit and protect against credit risk where possible in the housing finance system.

Since major housing policy tends to be reactionary and seldom comprehensive, inconsistencies and overlaps have developed resulting in dramatic shifts between the completely private market (PLS market), the semi-government backed market (conventional market via Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), and the fully government-backed Ginnie Mae market (FHA, VA, and USDA). One such area of inconsistency is in low downpayment lending, which is increasing as a proportion of the overall residential mortgage market. Currently, a single borrower is subject to different requirements and pays different premium rates for insurance or a guarantee on a low downpayment loan under private mortgage insurance (MI), the FHA, the USDA’s Rural Housing Service, the Department of Veterans Affairs, or state Housing Finance Agency programs—even though the borrower’s risk profile remains the same.

A coordinated policy would inform how low downpayment lending in the U.S. is carried out. For example, it is common in other types of insurance such as crop, flood and terrorism insurance, to limit government programs to higher risk borrowers or to condition access to supplemental capacity by requiring some demonstration of the need for that capacity. The FHA’s current loan limits do not provide a level playing field nor is there a direct preference for a private capital alternative.  Instead, any preference is done indirectly through premium rate setting and competition, which results in an unstable policy environment. The resulting outcome is dramatic fluctuations between these mortgage finance markets, which at times is most evident between the private mortgage insurance market and the 100% government-backed mortgage insurance market at FHA. While it may seem normal to have some fluctuations during different housing cycles, the recent market fluctuations have most often been the result of competition for market share between the two. This is neither conducive for the most efficient and effective mortgage finance market nor does it ensure that borrowers are being best served. Furthermore, there are redundancies and significant overlap between several government agencies such as FHA and the Rural Housing Service (RHS), where on repeated occasions the GAO[ii] and others have suggested consolidating the agencies or at least specific areas of intersection between them.

Of course a true comprehensive, coordinated housing policy will require reform of the GSEs—or as previously stated, fixing the parts of the housing finance system that were and are broken while enhancing the parts of the system that work. Although housing finance reform may not be the first focus of the new Congress and Administration, significant steps could be taken in the near-term to encourage greater reliance of private capital and market discipline in the housing finance system by establishing clarity about the roles of the different agencies in facilitating homeownership and by providing much greater transparency at both FHA and the GSEs about how these agencies price credit risk. Again, this difference between agencies is particularly sharp in the case of FHA and the conventional lending space with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which use private capital, such as private MI, to insure against a portion of first-loss on high LTV loans. However, in this case, a single borrower either pays a premium rate determined on an average basis (FHA) or a risk-based one (private MI), with the risk-based premium driven by “asset requirements” established by the government-guaranteed GSEs but not by the government-guaranteed FHA. So while there continues to be bipartisan support for reducing the government’s footprint and reducing taxpayers’ exposure to mortgage credit risk, the current market’s inconsistencies are considerable roadblocks to achieving that goal.

There are a number of different proposals for reforming the housing finance system, but most essential going forward is that Congress fixes one of the greatest flaws of the previous and current system, namely that government-backed entities – whether completely government controlled such as FHA or quasi-government such as the GSEs – should not set rules for and then compete on an unlevel playing field with the private market. These entities should perform explicit functions that foster greater participation by the private market, should promote a race-to-the top and not a race-to-the-bottom, and should be highly regulated. They should also be completely transparent in the credit risk they guarantee and how they price that credit risk. Transparency about how government prices credit risk would facilitate the greatest level of liquidity in these markets, and for credit risk transfer would foster an understanding of how these transactions are priced and the best execution for each. Finally, providing greater transparency will help end a structure where only a few agencies control the housing finance system because of their ownership of proprietary data, systems, and pricing. In conservatorship, the GSEs have an explicit guarantee on their Mortgage Backed Securities from the federal government. Therefore, until comprehensive housing finance reform is realized, critical steps could be taken now to improve transparency and foster greater understanding by market participants that will ultimately better inform borrowers. More transparent pricing will benefit lenders, investors, and most of all consumers and taxpayers.

As stated by former FHFA Director Ed DeMarco, housing finance reform “remains the great unfinished business from the Great Recession.” The complexity and political nature of the issues surrounding housing finance reform make it a daunting task to be sure, but the new Administration and Congress have a unique opportunity to make the housing finance system more coordinated, transparent, and disciplined to work for taxpayers and borrowers.

[i] Federal agencies involved with housing finance policy and regulation include FHFA, HUD, VA, USDA, Treasury, NCUA, and CFPB

[ii] U.S. Government Accountability Office, HOME MORTGAGE GUARANTEES: Issues to Consider in Evaluating Opportunities to Consolidate Two Overlapping Single-Family Programs (September 29, 2016).  See http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/680151.pdf.

Op-Ed: GSEs need greater taxpayer protection upfront

Posted on by Lindsey Johnson

 

 

 


By Lindsey Johnson

Eight years after taxpayers provided them with $187 billion, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two of the largest backers of mortgages, remain under government control. While these government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) are healthier today thanks to new safeguards that have improved the stability of the mortgage finance system, the goal is to put the GSEs on a stable footing for the long term.

Efforts to reduce government, and therefore taxpayers’, risk exposure by positioning more private capital in a so-called “first loss” position ahead of the GSEs are widely supported. Several approaches are being tested through an initiative called credit risk transfer (CRT). The vast majority of CRT today occurs after the loans have already been purchased by the GSEs where they hold the risk for some time before selling a portion of it “on the back end” to a third party—primarily asset managers and hedge funds. While it’s positive to see the GSEs seek to shift risk, how this transfer occurs is a question currently vexing policymakers. And, how it is done will have significant implications for the future of housing finance.

The GSEs’ regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), recently sought input on CRT, looking specifically at front-end approaches where the risk is transferred to a third party before it reaches the GSEs’ balance sheets. While this may seem novel, there’s a highly effective form of front-end risk transfer that has existed for six decades: private mortgage insurance (MI). MI is a good answer to policymakers’ question of how to further protect taxpayers while ensuring first-time buyers have access to home financing.

Typically, on conventional GSE loans with down payments less than 20 percent, MI covers the first losses before it ever reaches the GSEs. This front-end risk protection has paid off. Since the GSEs were placed into conservatorship, MIs have covered more than $50 billion in claims to the GSEs—risk that taxpayers didn’t need to cover. MI not only protects taxpayers, it helps creditworthy families without large down payments qualify for a mortgage. In the past year, MI has helped more than 795,000 Americans purchase or refinance their home—nearly half were first-time homebuyers and more than 40 percent had incomes below $75,000.

Private MI works—today it covers up to 35 percent of the value of a loan, and because it transfers credit risk at the loan’s origination, it’s a pure form of front-end risk share. The question being considered by FHFA now relates to the expansion of the current levels of private MI. This deeper level of MI can be done in a way that is fair for lenders of all sizes, achieves the objective of reducing taxpayer exposure, and offers pricing transparency, so if there is a savings to the consumer, it can be realized.

Here are some things FHFA and the GSEs should consider for CRT:

First, the housing finance market is cyclical. Therefore, FHFA needs to make sure all CRT structures will be available in the next downturn. Through the financial crisis mortgage insurers continued to pay claims and insure new home loans. The structure of mortgage insurers contributes to economic stability for a number of reasons, including that MI companies engage in countercyclical reserving. This means they reserve premiums collected during favorable economic times so they can pay increased claims during downturns. Mortgage insurers provide credit loss protection exclusively on residential mortgages and, unlike other forms of CRT, won’t exit should the market experience volatility or stress.

Second, new GSE requirements established robust standards for the industry’s capital levels, business activities, risk management, underwriting practices, quality control, lender approval, and monitoring activities. All of this makes MI different from other capital market structures, which disappeared during the crisis and have yet to return in any meaningful volume.

Third, the mortgage finance system cannot return to being controlled by, and benefitting only a few. Unlike other forms of CRT, deeper MI coverage can be made available to lenders without any biases or advantages based on size or volume. It’s simple to implement too, as it is operationally consistent for lenders to use as current mortgage insurance. MI also doesn’t require the posting of collateral, a challenge for some smaller lenders.

Finally, transparency is fundamental to better inform market participants, to make clear if there’s any borrower benefit among the different transaction types, and to enable the formation of a deep market for these transactions. MI pricing is transparent. Rate cards are standardized and published and other reports, including securities and state insurance filings, are publicly available to lenders and borrowers.

Until Congress determines the future of housing finance, FHFA is right to explore ways to transfer more risk away from taxpayers. However, not all risk sharing programs are equally effective. Deeper MI can help our nation build a stronger, more stable housing finance system that protects taxpayers and facilitates the homeownership for millions of Americans.

A version of this article originally appeared in The Hill on October 20, 2016.